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PRECAUTION, SCIENCE, AND LEARNING WHILE
DOING IN NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
Holly Doremus*
Abstract: Dealing with uncertainty is widely recognized as the key challenge for
environmental and natural resource decisionmaking. Too often, though, that challenge is
considered only from an ex ante perspective which treats uncertainty as an invariant feature
that must be accounted for but cannot be changed. With respect to many natural resource
management decisions, that picture is misleading. Decisions are often iterative or similar,
providing significant opportunities for leaming. Where such opportunities are available and
inaction is not feasible or desirable, learning while doing can provide the benefits of both the
precautionary principle and scientific decisionmaking while minimizing the key weaknesses
of each. After highlighting the benefits of a learning-while-doing approach to natural
resource management, this paper briefly addresses how management agencies might be
encouraged to adopt such an approach.
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Professor of Law, University of California, Davis. It is a great pleasure to participate in this
symposium honoring Bill Rodgers, one of the true giants of the field. Bill's scholarship, advocacy,
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natural resource law, but I aspire every day to do my own work with something approaching the
grace and good humor that characterize Bill's. As just one example, who but Bill would have
thought of publishing "environmental law trivia tests" that teach serious lessons about
environmental conflicts in a humorous way? See W. Rodgers, Environmental Law Trivia Test , 9
TULANE ENVTL. L.J. 75 (1995); William H. Rodgers, Jr., Environmental Law Trivia Test No. 2, 22
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 807 (1995); William H. Rodgers, Jr., A Superfund Trivia Test: A
Comment on the Complexity of Environmental Laws, 22 ENVTL. L. 417 (1992). 1 also want to
acknowledge the many ways in which my thinking about the relationship between science and law
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INTRODUCTION
Uncertainty is the unifying hallmark of environmental and natural
resource regulation. Dealing with uncertainty has been a major topic of
academic interest for decades, but the debate has produced no firm or
general conclusions.
Two alternatives frequently put forward for dealing with uncertainty
are the precautionary principle and scientific principles. Typically these
two are presented as standing in opposition. Precautionary
decisionmaking is described as favoring regulation when there is some
evidence of risk to human health or the environment. Scientific
decisionmaking is described as requiring proof of harm to support
regulation. In either case, the emphasis is almost always on a single
forward-looking decision that must be made based on a fixed level of
available information.
In this essay, I argue that a clearer picture of the challenges of
uncertainty for natural resource management requires a wider temporal
scope and additional degrees of freedom. Natural resource decisions
typically do not present a single choice between two alternatives that,
once made, remains fixed for all time. Far more often, multiple related
decisions must be made over a long period of time, on the scale of years
or even decades. Furthermore, the choices are more nuanced than "on"
versus "off' or "open" versus "closed." There is room for a variety of
conditions and limitations. Some decisions, such as how to operate a
series of dams and reservoirs, what terms to include in a water pollution
discharge permit, or whether and under what conditions to renew a
public lands grazing lease, are explicitly temporary and therefore must
be addressed repeatedly. Others are individually irreversible and
therefore made only once, but belong to classes of decisions sufficiently
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similar that information gained from one can usefully inform another.
Examples include salvage logging and wetlands filling.
One more detail should be added to this picture. Much of the
discussion of precaution versus science has been framed by the specific
context of regulating novel technologies or products. In that context,
preserving the status quo may have economic or human health
consequences, but it generally appears to protect the environment.
Natural resource management is different. A legacy of past decisions
made without regard for nature means that the status quo is often both
bad for the environment and strongly resistant to change. The large
water projects that dot the west, for example, have brought much of the
region's aquatic fauna to the brink of extinction. Because they provide
water to both cities and farms, however, shutting them down is not a
realistic short-term option. In other situations, the need for action to
correct past decisions is clear, but the effects of potential restoration
efforts are not. Decades of aggressive fire suppression, for instance, have
transformed open Ponderosa forests into thickets of fir. These altered
forests pose a fire risk to nearby human communities, but are also
inhospitable to some species native to the Ponderosa system. How best
to reduce fire risk while restoring native ecological communities is
unclear.
This more accurate picture of the decisionmaking task suggests that
we need not simply accept high levels of uncertainty. In at least some
cases, it is possible to reduce uncertainty over time in ways that are
relevant to subsequent iterations or related decisions. From that
perspective, the most important challenge of uncertainty is not always
how it should be accounted for in an initial decision. How to reduce
uncertainty through learning, in order to improve later rounds of
decisionmaking, may be more important. That policy choices can and
should encourage development of new technology is a commonplace
assumption in the pollution control context, where "technology forcing"
is an accepted policy goal.1 By the same token, "knowledge forcing"encouraging the development of additional knowledge to support future

1. For descriptions of the role and limits of technology forcing in environmental regulation, see,
e.g., Christopher T. Giovinazzo, Defending Overstatement: The Symbolic Clean Air Act and Carbon
Dioxide, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 99, 107, 114 (2006); Carol M. Rose, Scientific Innovation and
Environmental Protection: Some Ethical Considerations, 32 ENVTL. L. 755, 768-69 (2002);
Thomas 0. McGarity, Radical Technology-Forcing in Environmental Regulation, 27 LOY. LA. L.
REV. 943 (1994).
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decisions-should be a goal of natural resource policy. Yet active
learning is rarely incorporated into the resource management process.
For iterative or related decisions, where there is no "safe" choice,
precaution and science are not in tension. Both point us toward an
incremental framework for decisionmaking that emphasizes learning.
We might call that framework adaptive management, but for reasons
explained later I prefer the more descriptive phrase "learning while
doing." In this paper, I first explain how learning while doing can bring
the best of both precaution and science to bear on natural resource
management, while cabining the most significant shortcomings of each.
I then detail what I mean by learning while doing, and how it differs
from common understandings of adaptive management and "learning by
doing." Finally, I offer some thoughts on how our resource management
institutions might be structured to better support learning while doing,
and what executive, legislative, and judicial actors can do to encourage
knowledge forcing.
I.

LEARNING CONNECTS PRECAUTION WITH SCIENCE

Precautionary and scientific approaches to decisionmaking are often
characterized as distinct, and even incompatible. Although the two
approaches are indeed distinct, in many situations they are not only
compatible but also synergistic. For difficult natural resource
management choices, precaution and science frequently point in
precisely the same direction: toward assigning a key role to learning
while acting incrementally.
A.

The PrecautionaryPrincipleShould EncourageLearning

Properly understood, the precautionary principle mandates attention
to learning. That element, although it is implicit in the idea of
precaution, is underappreciated, leaving the role of learning
undertheorized. For many natural resource decisions, the most sensible
form of caution is learning while acting.
1.

The ConventionalFormulationof Precaution

The most frequently cited formulation of the precautionary principle
is found in the 1992 Rio Declaration:
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of
full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for
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postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation.2
The rationale behind the precautionary principle is simple: "better
safe than sorry." The precautionary intuition responds to three features
typical of environmental problems. First, people are prone to pay too
little attention to certain types of risk. New technologies or activities
may harm human health or the environment in unexpected ways. Those
harms may not become manifest for many years after the events that
cause them. Human cognitive biases and the structure of political
institutions make it likely that uncertain future environmental costs will
have less impact on decisions than certain and immediate economic
consequences. 3 Second, once set in motion, environmental impacts can
be difficult or impossible to reverse on human time scales. We are
already inexorably committed, for example, to some degree of global
warming because of fossil fuel consumption since the industrial
revolution. Less drastically, foreign species that have escaped
containment and propagated in new environments, such as the European
annual grasses that now dominate California's grasslands, are essentially
impossible to eradicate. The only way to have avoided these harms and
others like them would have been to restrict the activities that cause
them well in advance of any clear proof of harm. Third, it is often
difficult to unring the policy bell once choices are made. Some decisions
are quite literally irreversible. An old-growth tree, once felled, cannot be
pasted back together. Other trees may mature to replace it, but that can
take hundreds of years. Other decisions, like the annual determination of
allowable catch in a fishery, appear entirely reversible. They too
inevitably become sticky, however, as the institutions developed to
support them solidify and people build expectations around them. It is
almost always much easier to bar a new use than to withdraw approval
of an established one, 4 and to forego construction than to remove

2. Rio

Declaration

on

Environment

and

Development,

June

14,

1992,

U.N.

Doc.

A/CONF. 151/26/Rev. I (Vol. I), princ. 15, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874, 879 (1992).

3. David A. Dana, A Behavioral Economic Defense of the Precautionary Principle,97 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1315, 1320-26 (2003). Professor Robert Percival has also noted the political challenges of
regulating before harms become widely apparent. Robert V. Percival, Who's Afraid of the
PrecautionaryPrinciple?,23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 21, 36-78 (2005-2006).

4. The practice of "grandfathering" existing facilities or uses in order to reduce political
resistance to new regulations is well established. The costs of that practice have recently become
clear, as old electric power plants continue to spew air pollutants. Shi-Ling Hsu, The Real Problem
with New Source Review, 36 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,095 (2006). Percival cites another illustration: even
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existing infrastructure. Because "an ounce of prevention is worth a
pound of cure," it is not surprising that most advocates of the
precautionary principle emphasize its preventive role.
Context has pushed discussion of precaution even further in that
direction. The precautionary principle has been expounded primarily as a
way to deal with novel activities or technologies that pose poorly
understood risks.5 Preventive precaution is a natural fit for that context,
reminding us to think hard in advance about what could go wrong,
encouraging regulatory action before activities become too firmly
entrenched, and providing a way out of the regulatory paralysis that can
follow from endless quibbles about whether the available scientific
information meets some required threshold.6
But caution, as Christopher Stone reminds us, can mean different
things in different contexts.7 The conventional formulation of the
precautionary principle focuses on one particular type of caution: not
allowing potentially harmful agents through the regulatory starting gate
until we have reasonable confidence that their harms can be contained
within acceptable limits. Although it leaves room for later reexamination-the gate can always be opened if proponents of the new
substance or activity demonstrate its safety-that image focuses concern
strongly on a single decision, to open or close the gate, and indeed on a
single feature of that decision, how to account for uncertainty. 8 The
in the infamous CorrosionProof Fittings v. EPA case, which overturned EPA's decision to phase
out existing asbestos-containing products, the court upheld the agency's ban on introducing new
uses of asbestos. Percival, supra note 3, at 74; Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201,
1229 (5th Cir. 1991).
5. See, e.g., Christopher D. Stone, Is There a Precautionary Principle?, 31 ENVTL. L. REP.
10,790, 10,793 (2001) ("The precautionary principle is motivated by concern for a new generation
of risks, in large measure connected with the novelty of emerging technologies.").
6. Bernard D. Goldstein & Russellyn S. Carruth, Implications of the PrecautionaryPrinciplefor
Environmental Regulation in the United States: Examples from the Control of Hazardous Air
Pollutants in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2003, at

247, 248-49 ("An all-too-familiar ploy of industry is to obstruct or delay risk-based regulation by
requesting more scientific study or challenging its scientific validity in the courts.").
7. Stone, supra note 5, at 10,792-10,799. Cass Sunstein also notes that precaution appropriately
takes different forms in different contexts. He identifies a "Funding More Research Precautionary
Principle," an "Information Disclosure Precautionary Principle," an "Economic Incentives
Precautionary Principle," and a "Prohibitory Precautionary Principle" as fitting different
circumstances. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE

120-21 (2005).
8. 1 suspect that the prevailing static vision of decisionmaking in legal academic thinking derives
in part from the fact that legal training focuses so heavily on judicial opinions. Litigation is a
context in which decisions must be made on the basis of the information available at a single point
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focus, perhaps unconsciously, is on ex ante information gathering and
prediction, almost to the exclusion of ex post monitoring and
reconsideration. 9 The type of precaution produced by this ex ante focus
is not necessarily bad or misplaced, but it is surely incomplete.
2.

Learning Can be Precautionary

In fact, the precautionary principle implicitly requires openness to
learning. Ideally, it provides "a framework for learning in the face of
uncertainty."'10 John Applegate makes this point when he describes
"iteration," the periodic revisiting of decisions, as an essential feature of
a precautionary approach:
Action taken on the basis of uncertainty is necessarily tentative,
and the principle thus implies that some action will be taken by
someone to reduce the uncertainty to levels appropriate for
taking final regulatory action."
Not only is a willingness to revisit decisions an inescapable element
of the precautionary approach, it "makes early precautionary action more
palatable and indeed more sensible."' 2 Given uncertainty, we know that
any regulatory decision might be wrong. We should, therefore, seek to
increase our knowledge over time and be prepared to revisit decisions as
justified by new information.
Still, as Professor Applegate notes, the ways that learning might play3
a role in precautionary decisionmaking have rarely been emphasized.'

in time, no matter how limited that information may be, and those decisions are not generally
subject to revisiting later in light of additional information. Regulation is very different; in that
context, we typically enjoy the opportunity for a policy cycle, in which successive decisions are
deliberately revisited over time.
9. The ex ante focus of the conventional understanding of the precautionary principle is hardly
unique in environmental decisionmaking. Brad Karkkainen has described in detail how
requirements for environmental assessment have produced only limited leaming because they only
look forward. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing
Government's EnvironmentalPerformance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (2002).
10. Sheila Jasanoff, Between Risk and Precaution - Reassessing the Future of GM Crops, 3 J.

RISK RESEARCH 277, 277 (2000).
11. John S. Applegate, The Taming of the PrecautionaryPrinciple,27 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L.
& POL'Y REV. 13, 20 (2002).

12. Id. at 75-76. See also Sidney A. Shapiro and Robert L. Glicksman, RISK REGULATION AT
RISK (2003) (promoting pragmatic "back-end" adjustment of regulation as a way to improve both
substantive outcomes and political viability).
13. Applegate, supra note 11, at 43 (describing iteration as "the relative newcomer" to the
precautionary principle).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 82:547, 2007

Discussion of learning comes in only two forms, each assuming that the
only relevant decision is to act or not act. Supporters of the
precautionary principle like to extol the incentives for new development
or release of new information provided by putting the burden of proof on
proponents of new activities or technologies. 14 From the other side,
skeptics occasionally remind advocates of a precautionary approach of
the need to "at the least, discuss a research program that would, after the
precautionary5 action, let us know whether the action was appropriate and
'
beneficial."'
Conspicuously absent from most discussions of the precautionary
principle is the concept that the decision to act does not end the
opportunity for caution. Suppose, for example, that the lights go out
suddenly one night while I am sitting in my living room, plunging me
into darkness. Putting caution above all else, I could remain in my chair.
That would keep me safe from bumping into walls, stubbing my toes on
the furniture, or tripping over toys scattered on the floor. If there is a
high probability that the problem is in the utility lines outside the home,
staying seated is probably the wisest choice, at least in the short run.
Getting up subjects me to some level of risk but does nothing to get the
lights back on. If there's a good chance that the cause of the outage is a
blown fuse in the house, though, getting up starts to sound better. The
gatekeeping decision, to get out of the chair, is not the only chance to
exercise caution. Once up I can proceed cautiously, feeling ahead with
my arms and shuffling my feet to minimize the chance that I will suffer
harm.
A significant proportion of natural resource management decisions
calls for moving in the dark, rather than sitting still. Learning while
doing, rather than freezing the status quo, is the appropriate type of
caution when significant uncertainty is accompanied by two additional
elements. First, it must be reasonable to believe that uncertainty can be
reduced in ways that matter for management choices over management-

14. Dana, supra note 3, at 1328; Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of
Environmental Law to Produce Needed Information on Health and the Environment 53 DUKE L.J.
1619, 1741--42 (2004); Hildreth et al., Roles for a PrecautionaryApproach in U.S. Marine

Resources Management, NATURAL RESOURCE & ENV'T, Summer 2004, at 64, 65.
15. Goldstein & Carruth, supra note 6, at 258. See also Gail Charnley & E. Donald Elliott, Risk
Versus Precaution:Environmental Law and Public Health Protection, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,363,

10,365 (2002) ("Proponents of the precautionary principle have yet to clarify how regulation based
on precaution in the absence of adequate science can be revisited and changed when better science
becomes available.").
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relevant time periods, without incurring unacceptable risks of harm. In
the electric outage example, I believe I can figure out the way to a
flashlight or the circuit breaker box while risking only a bruise or
stubbed toe. If the situation were different, such that a wrong step might
send me hurtling off a high tower, I would certainly be less inclined to
move at all. Second, inaction must be either impractical or itself risky. If
a blown fuse in my house has interrupted the power supply, power will
never be restored unless someone in the household gets up. Inaction is
safe, but cannot address the problem. Alternatively, suppose that a
member of the household relies on electrically-powered medical devices
which can run on battery back-up power only for a short time. In that
situation, inaction would be safe in one sense, but very risky in another.
The choice between learning while doing and inaction as forms of
precaution generally depends upon the relative risks of action and
inaction, the extent of external pressure for action, and the extent to
which action can be taken in incremental, reversible steps. Those factors
vary with both the context and the perspective of the observer.
At least three classes of natural resource management decisions
justify a precautionary approach that emphasizes learning while doing.
In the first, inaction or maintenance of the status quo itself presents
significant risks to the natural world. This situation is more common
than might be expected, because past decisions have greatly modified
many natural systems. A well-known example is fire suppression on
national forest lands. Much of the arid west burned periodically before
Anglo-American settlement. Characteristic fire regimes varied widely.
In some areas, low-intensity fires swept through as often as once or
twice a decade. Others were subject to intense, stand-replacing fires at
intervals of a hundred years or more. 16 Since the early twentieth century,
however, the U.S. Forest Service has aggressively sought to suppress
fire on the lands under its supervision. 17 Fire exclusion has drastically
altered the ecology of acres of lands with a history of frequent lowintensity fires, turning them from open stands into thickets at risk of
much higher-intensity crown fires.1 8 In areas with such altered fire
regimes,

16. Robert B. Keiter, The Law of Fire: Reshaping Public Land Policy in an Era of Ecology and
Litigation, 36 ENVTL. L. 301, 313-14 (2006).
17. Id. at 304-308.
18. Noss et al., supranote 16, at 483.
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[k]ey structural elements (e.g. old "veteran" trees), terrestrial
and aquatic biodiversity, and habitats of many threatened and
endangered species are already greatly diminished and at
continuing risk of loss.19
Leaving these forests in their current condition carries substantial risks
for the environment, as well as for nearby human communities, but no
consensus has developed as to the best way to address those risks.
The second class of decisions that call for precautionary action rather
than stasis is those for which inaction is impractical for socioeconomic
reasons. The difficulty of reversing historic environmentally-damaging
decisions increases in parallel with the reliance of human communities
on those decisions. While we might not take those actions in the first
place today, we cannot undo them overnight. Consider, for example,
operation of the facilities that transport immense volumes of water from
northern to southern California through the Sacramento-San Joaquin
Delta. The combined operations of the federal Central Valley Project
and State Water Project, which can move eleven thousand cubic feet of
water per second, have drastically altered the ecology of the Delta. The
massive Project pumps divert about 5,000,000 acre-feet of freshwater
annually. That water irrigates nearly 3,000,000 acres of farmland 20 and
provides about forty percent of California's drinking water, 2,
contributing to drinking water systems that serve 23,000,000 people,
nearly two-thirds of California's population.22 It is highly unlikely that
the Delta pumps will be shut down for prolonged periods in the near
23
term, even though that might be the best solution for the environment.
19. Id. at 481.
20. URS Corp., Status and Trends of Delta-Suisun Services, Report for California Department of
Draft
19
(Mar.
2007),
available
at
Water
Resources,
Public
Review
http://www.deltavision.ca.gov/docs/DVStatusandTrends.pdf.
21. Elizabeth Ann Rieke, The Bay-Delta Accord: A Stride Toward Sustainability, 67 U. COLO. L.
REV. 341,344 (1996).

22. URS Corp., supranote 20, at 19.
23. In fact, the pumps have operated for years without a state permit to take endangered species,
apparently in flagrant violation of state law. Even that revelation is not likely to shut them down
soon, however. Early in 2007, a California trial court ruled that the State Water Project pumps
cannot continue to operate without a California Endangered Species Act permit. Judgment Granting
Peremptory Writ of Mandate, Watershed Enforcers v. Cal. Dept. of Water Res., No. RG06292124
at
Ct.,
County
of
Alameda,
Apr.
18,
2007),
available
(Super.
http://apps.alameda.courts.ca.gov/fortecgi/fortecgi.exe?ServiceName=DomainWebService&Templa
teName=index.html. The Department of Water Resources has vigorously objected to that ruling,
emphasizing the impacts that shutting down the pumps would have on municipal and agricultural
water supplies. Declaration of Carl Torgerson in Support of Request for Hearing, Watershed
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Other steps might provide as much or more benefit to Delta species as
shutting down the pumps. Patterns of water flow through or around the
Delta might be changed, spawning habitats might be improved, and the
salinity in the western Delta might be allowed to vary more than it
currently does.24 There is plenty to learn about the response of Delta
species and systems to these and other management choices. Focusing
on the pumps alone hides other impacts that might be just as important,
and more amenable to correction.
The third set of decisions calling for learning while doing is less
obvious: those which, although individually small and essentially
irreversible, are repeated often enough to produce cumulatively
significant impacts, and over a long enough period of time to permit
learning and adjustment. Examples include the approval of individual
salvage logging or forest thinning projects, the granting of permits to fill
wetlands, and the issuance of permits allowing the incidental take of
endangered species. Collectively, decisions like these offer significant
opportunities for learning.
B.

Science Provides a Processfor StructuredLearning

Virtually everyone involved in debates about environmental and
natural resource policy in the United States emphasizes the need for
science to drive decisions. The policy debates, however, reveal little

Enforcers v. Cal. Dept. of Water Res., No. RG06292124 (Super. Ct., County of Alameda, Apr. 10,
2007), available at http://www.publicaffairs.water.ca.gov/newsreleases/2007/041107impacts3.pdf.
The state trial court's ruling has been stayed pending appeal. See Mike Taugher, Water Agency
Appeals Pumping Ruling, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, May 8, 2007, at A10; Memorandum from
Department
of
Water
Resources
to
L.
Ryan
Broddrick,
Department
of
Fish
and
Game
(May
7,
2007),
available
at
http://www.publicaffairs.water.ca.gov/newsreleases/2007/050807cesa-memo.pdf. Another wrinkle
was added by a federal court ruling that the federal permit allowing incidental take of the Delta
smelt was invalid. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment, NRDC v. Kempthorne, No. 1:05-CV-01207 OWW (TAG) (May 25, 2007), availableat
http://www.earthjustice.org/library/legal-docs/decision-on-delta-smelt-biop.pdf. The federal court,
however, refused to enjoin pumping. In early summer 2007, the Department of Water Resources did
voluntarily curtail pumping for nine days, but ramped it up as the irrigation season kicked in and
municipalities began to suffer shortages. See Matt Weiser, Delta Pumps Halted, SACRAMENTO BEE,
June 1, 2007, at Al; Mike Taugher, Water Crisis May Not Be Over, TRIVALLEY HERALD, July 3,
2007. As of early July 2007, the pumps were operating amid concern that another temporary halt
might be imminent. See id; Eric Bailey, Delta on the Brink, Panelists Warn, LOS ANGELES TIMES,
July 3, 2007.

24. For an outstanding overview of Delta management issues, see JAY LUND ET AL., ENVISIONING
FUTURES FOR THE SACRAMENTO-SAN JOAQUIN DELTA (2007).
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understanding of the nature of scientific inquiry, or sensitivity to the
strengths and limitations of science. Shared misunderstandings make it
easy for those skeptical of environmental protection to characterize the
precautionary principle as anti-scientific. Although that charge is
mistaken, it is invited by the prevailing front-loaded descriptions of the
precautionary principle. When both the nature of precaution and the
nature of scientific inquiry are more clearly highlighted, it becomes clear
that the two are fully consistent, joined by a commitment to learning.
While precaution provides the motivation for learning, science provides
the method.
1.

The Relationship Between Science and Precaution

The push for scientific decisionmaking is driven in large part by a
quest for objectivity. Science is popularly supposed to be free of emotion
or bias, a characteristic that may seem especially important in natural
resource policy, where the depth of value conflicts across society is
painfully apparent. Some participants in environmental debates may
genuinely be hoping to find scientific approaches that rise above those
conflicts.2 5 Some may be looking for ways to counter known
shortcomings of human cognition.26 Others may simply hope to exploit
public faith in science to hide the role their own values play in
motivating their positions.27
The reification of scientific decisionmaking as objective and unbiased
dovetails nicely with one of the main criticisms of the precautionary
principle: that its amorphousness invites subjectivity that renders it
"subject to abuse by policy makers. '' 28 It is not surprising that critics of

25. See, e.g., Michael Oppenheimer, Defining DangerousAnthropogenic Interference: The Role

of Science, the Limits of Science, 25 RISK ANALYSIS 1399, 1401 (2005) (noting the "strong interest
[among climate change commentators] in establishing a category of risk that circumvents or at least
limits the complications inherent in drawing on the social science perspective or incorporating value
judgments.").
26. Cass Sunstein, for example, seeks to replace the precautionary principle, which he sees as
embodying "the various cognitive limitations that people face in thinking about risks," with a more
rational, cost-benefit analysis approach. SUNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 62, 129.
27. Perhaps the most infamous recent example of this phenomenon is the notorious memo urging
Republican politicians to exploit the political power of science-based rhetoric in discussing global
warming that was leaked to the press in early 2003. The Luntz Research Companies, Straight Talk,
The Environment: A Cleaner, Safer, Healthier America, at 138, available at
http://www.luntzspeak.com/graphics/LuntzResearch.Memo.pdf.
28. John D. Graham, Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of
Management and Budget, The Role of Precaution in Risk Assessment and Management: An
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the precautionary principle tend to describe precaution as the opposite of
scientific decisionmaking. Gail Charnley and Donald Elliott, for
example, characterize precautionary decisions as those made "in the
absence of adequate science," and argue that such decisions should
include some signal "that policy, not science, underlies those
standards."2 9 In another paper, Charnley directly calls the precautionary
principle anti-scientific. 30 Frank Cross complains about "the disdain for
scientific evidence" of precautionary principle advocates.3 1 In a similar
vein, critics have accused the European Union of turning to "a simplistic
vision of the precautionary approach to biotech crops" because "the
traditional science of risk assessment was not on [its] side, ' 32 and the
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization has publicly worried
that environmental groups would use the precautionary principle "as an
argument to dismiss the role of science in fisheries management. 3 3 A
Wall Street Journal editorial presented this criticism in its sharpest form:
"The precautionary 'principle' is an environmentalist neologism,
invoked to trump scientific evidence and move directly to banning things
hydrocarbon
wireless
technology,
they don't34 like-biotech,
emissions."
(Jan.
11-12,
View
American's
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/eu-speech.html.

2002),

available

at

29. Chamley & Elliott, supra note 15, at 10,365. The characterization of precautionary
decisionmaking as the polar opposite of a science-based approach so dominates legal scholarship
that even thoughtful scholars sympathetic to the precautionary approach have adopted it. J.B. Ruhl,
for example, lists "The Precautionary Principle Method" and "The Scientific Method" as two
competing models for decisionmaking under the Endangered Species Act. J.B. Ruhl, The Battle
Over Endangered Species Act Methodology, 34 ENVTL. L. 555, 556 (2004).
30. Professor Percival quotes Chamley as accusing the precautionary principle's "proponents of
waging 'the newest skirmish in the age-old battle between empirical science and anti-empirical
ideology."' Percival, supra note 3, at 27, quoting President's Message, RISK NEWSLETTER
(Soc'y for Risk Analysis, McLean, Va.), Third Quarter 1999, at 2.
31. Frank B. Cross, ParadoxicalPerils of the PrecautionaryPrinciple,53 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
851, 854 (1996).
32. Thomas P. Redick, Stewardship for Biotech Crops: Strategies for Improving Global
Consumer Confidence, 44 JURIMETRICS J.5, 18 (2003).

33. Olav Schram Stokke & Clare Coffey, Precaution,ICES and the Common FisheriesPolicy: A
Study of Regime Interplay, 28 MARINE POLICY 117, 118 (2004) (quoting FAO, PRECAUTIONARY
APPROACH TO CAPTURE FISHERIES AND SPECIES INTRODUCTIONS, FAO TECHNICAL GUIDELINES
FOR RESPONSIBLE FISHERIES 2 (1996)).

34. Editorial, Fear of the Future, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2000, at A18. Ronald Bailey, who is
associated with the Competitive Enterprise Institute and Cato Institute, echoes that view: "The
precautionary principle is an anti-science regulatory concept that allows regulators to ban new
products or technologies on the barest suspicion that they might pose some unknown threat."
Ronald Bailey, Op-Ed, Food and Trade: EU Fear-Mongers' Lethal Harvest, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 18,
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Claims that a precautionary approach is "anti-scientific" or
inconsistent with scientific principles rest on a category mistake. It is
simply incoherent to compare "science" with "precaution." The two are
different tools designed to serve different purposes. Science is a set of
(ideally) value-neutral tools, a process for deepening our understanding
of the natural world. It does not, and indeed cannot, tell us what we
should do with that understanding. It can illuminate the consequences of
policy choices, but it does not dictate those choices. Commentators who
describe scientific decisionmaking as imposing a high standard of proof
are grafting their own policy preferences onto the available scientific
information. Precaution, on the other hand, is a moral argument that
makes no pretense of value neutrality. It provides normative judgments
about how information generated by science (including the limits and
lingering uncertainties of that information) should be translated into
individual or societal action. Science and precaution, in other words, are
not substitutable in the decisionmaking process. They play different but
equally necessary roles in that process. Science provides data.
Precaution is one way to turn data into decisions. If science is the anvil,
precaution is the moral hammer.3 5 One might choose a different
hammer, a different anvil, or even a completely different approach to
bending steel, but it makes no sense to criticize a hammer for not being a
good anvil.
It is not surprising, however, that many commentators have done
exactly that. The rhetoric of research science is easily misread to suggest
that science provides a universal, objective filter for deciding how much
information is needed to support a particular regulatory or management
decision. Scientific research papers often speak of hypotheses as
"proven" or "falsified" by the evidence. Social conventions or practice
norms have developed in various fields of science to govern such
assertions. The most widely recognized of these is the commonlyapplied standard that statistical tests must support a ninety-five percent
confidence level that an observed effect did not arise by chance before a
claim of proof is made. Regulatory skeptics take that confidence level as

2002, at M3.
35. Cf Herman E. Daly, Introduction to the Steady-State Economy, in ECONOMICS, ECOLOGY,
ETHICS I, I (Herman E. Daly ed., 1980) ("Growth chestnuts have to be placed on the unyielding
anvil of biophysical realities and then crushed with the hammer of moral argument. The entropy law

and ecology provide the biophysical anvil. Concern for future generations and subhuman life and
inequities in current wealth distribution provide the moral hammer.") (quoted in Christopher H.
Schroeder, Prophets,Priests, and Pragmatists,87 MiNN. L. REV. 1065, 1065 (2003)).
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an ineluctable, and entirely objective, element of a "scientific" approach
to decisionmaking. In reality, though, the identification of levels of
statistical "significance" is a subjective policy choice, reflecting nothing
more profound than an implicit judgment by the relevant community
about the relative costs of different sorts of errors.3 6 There is nothing
incoherent or scientifically improper about choosing those levels, or the
statistical tests to apply, in a more or less precautionary way.37
Viewing precaution and science as polar opposites magnifies two
related mistakes we are already inclined to make. The first is assuming
that the application of science, or quantitative cost-benefit analysis or
some other "rational" technique, can guarantee objective decisions.
Judgment is inevitably required to interpret or understand scientific
data.38 The more incomplete or inconclusive the data, the more the
judgments will vary with the subjective preferences or biases of the
interpreter.3 9 Ultimately values, not formulas, must determine our
environmental policy decisions, just as they determine other important
policy choices. The second mistake is believing that strong objectivity is
a necessary element of principled environmental decisionmaking. We
seem to fear that unless environmental policy decisions are so objective
as to be computable by formula, they will not be grounded in anything
other than the whim or preference of the decisionmaker. As David Dana
has pointed out, however, in other areas, even those that lie at the core of
our democratic tradition, we do not demand determinacy. ° Pining
obsessively for unachievable objectivity in environmental policy gets in
the way of an honest search for useful decisionmaking principles.
36. See. e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative
Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L.J.

729, 748-49 (1979); John Lemons et al., The PrecautionaryPrinciple:Scientific Uncertainty and
Type I and Type I1 Errors, 2 FOUND. OF SCI. 207, 227-30 (1997); Holly Doremus, Science Plays
Defense: Natural Resource Management in the Bush Administration, 32 ECOLOGY L. Q. 249,

262-64 (2005).
37. See Daniel J. McGarvey, Merging Precaution with Sound Science Under the Endangered

Species Act, 57 BIoSCIENCE 65 (2007) (advocating the use of statistical equivalence tests, rather
than hypothesis tests, in ESA implementation in order to better recognize and take account of the
dangers of false negative results).
38. That judgment plays an essential role in scientific practice has been widely recognized since
Thomas Kuhn published his influential book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
39. See Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions Under the Endangered Species Act: Why Better
Science Isn't Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. L. Q. 1029, 1068 (1997); Holly Doremus & A.
Dan Tarlock, Science, Judgment and Controversy in NaturalResource Regulation, 26 PUB. LAND &
RESOURCES L. REV. 1,8-11 (2005).

40. Dana, supra note 3, at 1318.
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The True Strength of Science Lies in Its Capacity to Promote
Learning

Although a scientific approach to decisions cannot provide absolute
objectivity, it can and should promote and support learning. As I have
written elsewhere:
The essence of science is not objective certainty. It is, instead, a
process carefully designed to illuminate the extent and reliability
of knowledge about studied systems, and to increase the
reliability and extent of that knowledge over the course of
time.41
In other words, what science provides is a structured process designed to
identify gaps in understanding and facilitate learning over time.
The potential for learning has too often been ignored in environmental
regulation and natural resource management. Although some
uncertainties will always remain, it is not true that all of the uncertainties
that plague policy choices are irreducible. Careful application of
scientific techniques should enhance learning about managed systems.
Generally, a scientific approach requires developing and testing
hypotheses about how those systems work. Hypotheses need not be
detailed or elaborate. Testing by controlled experimentation produces
the most robust results. Opportunities for experiments are limited in
natural systems, however, because confounding variables cannot
practically be controlled and risks to protected resources may impose
limits on manipulation. Even severe limits on experimentation, however,
do not amount to prohibitions on learning. Other techniques, including
current and historical observations, 42 manipulation of models, laboratory
experiments, and analogies from similar or related systems, may offer
useful information.
Scientific learning is a complex process that does not happen
automatically. There are any number of points in the process where
things can go wrong.43 Simply recognizing that attention to learning,

41. Doremus, Science Plays Defense, supra note 36, at 297.
42. One intriguing example of attempts to integrate historical data into modem resource
management comes from the history arm of the multidisciplinary Census of Marine Life. One of
three major prongs of the Census is the History of Marine Animal Populations project, which
"collects and interprets historical records to build pictures of past oceanic conditions" in order to
inform goals for ocean sustainability. Katharine Anderson, Does History Count?, 30 ENDEAVOUR

150, 150 (2006).
43. I describe some of the challenges of generating scientific information and making sure that
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rather than perfectly objective decisionmaking, is the fundamental
hallmark of a scientific approach will not guarantee that we learn more.
But it will surely encourage us to pay more attention to what learning
can do for us and how we might promote it in particular contexts.
C.

The Synergistic Potentialof Precautionand Science

Neither science nor precaution alone provides a reliable guide to
natural resource management. Because each addresses important
shortcomings in the other, however, they are synergistic. Science
reminds precaution that fear need not be paralyzing and that action need
not mean the complete loss of regulatory control. Precaution reminds
science to be humble about the limits of current understanding and open
to the full range of possible explanations. For many natural resource
decisions, the two together point in the direction of emphasizing learning
in the course of action.
1.

How Science Can Improve Precaution

The two most telling criticisms of precautionary decisionmaking are
that it can cause paralysis and that it papers over choices between
competing risks. Bringing scientific evaluation of the possibilities for
learning to bear can help address these closely intertwined criticisms.
Cass Sunstein is the most prominent critic of the paralyzing tendency
of precaution, which he attributes to the fact that alternative choices
often pose competing risks. If the precautionary principle were applied
in the strong form advocated by some, to bar any action that poses
significant risks, it would seem to prohibit the introduction of such
desirable new technologies as electricity, automobiles, and
immunization. But, Sunstein points out, foregoing those technologies
poses its own risks. Although immunization may cause disease in a
fraction of those vaccinated, without it epidemics may rage unchecked.
Similarly, the conventional practice of disinfecting drinking water by
chlorination produces detectable quantities of toxic organochlorine

information is available for and considered in decisionmaking in Holly Doremus, Data Gaps in
Natural Resource Management: Sniffing for Leaks Along the Information Pipeline, - INDIANA L.
REv. __ (forthcoming 2007).
44. SUNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 25. See also Cross, supra note 31 (arguing that health and
environmental regulation often produces unanticipated adverse health and environmental
consequences).
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compounds and brings the risk of a major accidental release of gaseous
chlorine during transport, 45 but leaving water untreated puts the public at
risk of waterborne diseases. In situations where both action and inaction
pose risks, Sunstein argues that strong forms of the precautionary
principle "stand[] as an 46obstacle to regulation and nonregulation, and to
everything in between.
Sunstein's major answer to the potential for precautionary paralysis is
to call for cost-benefit analysis to highlight the trade-offs inherent in
choices between alternative actions. But where the available information
about the consequences of action is highly uncertain, as it must be to
justify invoking precaution, cost-benefit analysis adds little
decisionmaking power.4 7 Sunstein himself has recognized the notorious
indeterminacy of cost-benefit analysis, writing that the benefits of EPA's
arsenic regulation could reasonably be estimated at anywhere from $10
million to $1.2 billion.4 8 It is difficult to see how estimates with
uncertainty ranges as high as 10 orders of magnitude add anything to the
simple recognition that arsenic might or might not pose a significant
human health risk.
Because most natural resource decisionmaking is dynamic, however,
the possibility of learning offers a way out of paralysis that cost-benefit
analysis does not. Where the need to act is combined with uncertainty
about the consequences of alternative actions, one key question is
whether uncertainty might be reducible, at what cost, and on what time
scale. A second is how quickly and irreversibly alternative choices are
likely to commit us to environmental harm. If there is some prospect of
useful learning and some room for incremental action while we address
information gaps, learning while doing takes advantage of the best
features of both precaution and science.
Suppose, for example, that we are uncertain whether to allow planting
of "Bt corn," corn genetically engineered to contain a natural insecticidal
protein derived from the bacterium Bacillus thuringensis (Bt). Potential
environmental risks include development of insect resistance to Bt,
45. See Paul Orum, Toxic Trains and the Terrorist Threat: How Water Utilities Can Get Chlorine
Gas Off the Rails and Out of American Communities (Apr. 2007), available at
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/04/pdf/chemicalsecurityjreport.pdf (detailing the
risks of a major accident in the transportation of chlorine).
46. SUNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 33.
47. Gregory N. Mandel & James Thuo Gathii, Cost-Benefit Analysis Versus the Precautionary
Principle:Beyond Cass Sunstein's Laws of Fear, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 1037, 1045.

48. Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic ofArsenic, 90 GEO. L.J. 2255, 2258 (2002).
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increased mortality of non-target organisms, and human or animal health
impacts as Bt grains are introduced into the feed and food supply. When
Bt crops were first developed, it was difficult to estimate either the
probability or the potential magnitude of these harms, or the
effectiveness of measures that might mitigate or prevent them. On the
other side of the equation, use of Bt corn has the potential to reduce
dependence on traditional chemical pesticides more toxic to humans.
Furthermore, if Bt corn controls the European corn borer, the major
insect pest of corn, more effectively than chemical treatments, that could
produce an indirect human health benefit. High levels of corn borer
damage facilitate the establishment of Fusarium, a fungal disease of
corn, both by directly carrying the fungus into corn ears and by opening
holes that can provide pathways for airborne infection. Some Fusarium
species produce a toxin known as fumonisin. Dietary intake of
fumonisin has been linked to certain types of cancers and birth defects,
especially in Mexican-American women who consume large quantities
of unprocessed corn. Some field studies have shown lower levels of
fumonisin in Bt than in non-Bt corn lines. 49 Like the risks, these
potential benefits were highly uncertain when Bt corn was first
developed.
In the United States, crops engineered to express Bt proteins are
regulated as pesticides under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). 50 Like other pesticides, Bt corn lines may not
be lawfully sold until they are formally registered. 51 Registration
requires a finding that the pesticide, "when used in accordance with
widespread and commonly recognized practice... will not generally
cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment., 52 That
judgment, which requires a balancing of risks and benefits, is obviously
difficult to make when both are uncertain.
FIFRA allows EPA to deal with uncertainty through a precautionary
learning approach.5 3 EPA can issue experimental use permits to allow

49. This discussion of the potential indirect health benefits of Bt corn is drawn from Drew L.
Kershen, Health and Food Safety: The Benefits of Bt-Corn, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 197, 198-206
(2006).
50. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y(2006).
51.

7 U.S.C. § 136a(a).

52. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5).
53. For a concise and lucid description of the FIFRA registration process, see Mary Jane Angelo,
Embracing Uncertainty, Complexity and Change: An Eco-Pragmatic Reinvention of a FirstGeneration EnvironmentalLaw, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 105 (2006).
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field testing designed to generate information.5 4 It can conditionally
register a pesticide while additional data are gathered. Special
restrictions can be imposed during the period of conditional registration
to protect against unreasonable adverse effects. 55 EPA can also limit and
impose conditions on uses through labeling restrictions, which FIFRA
requires users to follow. 56 Even after full registration, EPA can require
registrants 57
to submit additional data, on pain of suspension of
registration.
EPA could have used its FIFRA authorities to, for example,
experiment with different insect refuge strategies for limiting
development of resistance, require close monitoring of impacts on nontarget organisms, set up and test mechanisms for tracking Bt corn after
harvest, or monitor the levels of fungal toxins in Bt corn products. Any
of those steps could enhance learning. Identifying measures likely to fill
major information gaps and allowing experimental use or conditional
registration while those measures were implemented would have been
both scientifically sound and precautionary. It would have facilitated the
efficient development of stronger information about both the risks and
benefits of Bt corn without unduly delaying the introduction of a
potentially useful new technology. That the saga of Bt corn has played
out without such a focus on learning5 8 speaks to the challenges of
implementing a precautionary learning approach. Those challenges are
addressed below.
2.

How PrecautionCan Improve Science

Just as precautionary decisionmaking can gain legitimacy from
attention to science, scientific decisionmaking can benefit from the dose
of humility that attention to precaution brings. Scientists are no more
perfect than the rest of humanity. They suffer from many of the same
ingrained cognitive biases that plague others. Their focus on data helps
scientists battle some of these biases, but their expertise actually makes
them more prone than others to one particular bias: "overconfidence in
54. 7 U.S.C. § 136c.
55. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(7).
56. 7 U.S.C. § 136j(a)(2)(G).
57. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).
58. See Rebecca Bratspies, The Illusion of Care: Regulation, Uncertainty, and Genetically
Modified Food Crops, 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 297 (2002) (describing the reluctance of EPA to
develop, impose, or monitor structured refuge requirements for Bt corn).
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their own judgments. 5 9 Experts are "often wrong but rarely in doubt. 6 °
Experts also tend to overestimate the importance of their field of
expertise and to underestimate what other perspectives might bring to
the problem.6 ' In a word, experts, including scientists, are prone to
hubris.
That can be problematic for the progress of scientific knowledge in
general, but particularly for policy decisions that require a sound
scientific understanding of the natural world. It can reinforce the type of
uncertainty Brian Wynne calls "ignorance," which encompasses the
aspects of a problem that we not only do not understand, but that we are
also not even aware that we do not understand.62 Wynne provides an
example from the aftermath of the Chernobyl incident. As the
radioactive cloud passed over Wales, rain brought radioactive cesium
down over upland areas. Scientists assured the public that there would be
no lasting effects, but several weeks later a ban was suddenly imposed
on the slaughter and sale of sheep from the hill areas. Wynne explains
that, based on past observations, scientists had assumed that cesium
would quickly become immobilized in the soil. But it turned out that
their knowledge was incomplete. Earlier observations had all been made
in alkaline soils, but the Welsh hill soils were acidic.

63

Scientists had

assumed that they understood how cesium behaved in soils. Their
knowledge blinded them to their ignorance; they had not realized that
their understanding was limited to behavior in a restricted class of soils.
A truly precautionary approach would help experts (both inside and
outside of regulatory agencies) keep in mind the potential for these sorts
of biases and thereby stay open to new and unexpected knowledge.
Precaution can maximize the likelihood that decisionmakers will notice
and take advantage of opportunities for learning by serving as a constant
reminder of the limits of current information.

59. Dana, supra note 3, at 1333; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology
and Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 560-61 (2002).
60. Dale Griffin & Amos Tversky, The Weighing of Evidence and the Determinants of
Confidence, 24 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 411, 412 (1992).
61. Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 59, at 560.
62. Brian Wynne, Uncertainty and Environmental Learning: Reconceiving Science and Policy in
the Preventive Paradigm, 2 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 111, 114 (1992).
63. Id.
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A FRAMEWORK FOR LEARNING WHILE DOING IN
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

In situations where action is perceived to be necessary but its
consequences are uncertain, both an urge toward precaution and a
commitment to science suggest that we look for ways to act
incrementally while learning. That, of course, is easier said than done. In
this part, I explain my terminology, sketch the rough outlines of a
learning-while-doing approach, and offer some suggestions for how
executive, legislative, and judicial actors could help agencies surmount
the considerable barriers to adopting such an approach.
A.

Adaptive Management By Any Other Name?

Learning while doing is hardly a new concept. In many ways it is
what Charles Lindblom described as "muddling through" in a celebrated
1959 paper, by contrast with the academic ideal of comprehensively
rational decisionmaking.6 4 Learning while doing would also seem to be
at the core of proposals for adaptive management, an idea often appealed
to but rarely achieved in natural resource management. The essence of
adaptive management, according to J.B. Ruhl, is "an iterative,
incremental decisionmaking process built around a continuous process
of monitoring the effects of decisions and adjusting decisions
accordingly. ' '65 Adaptive management gets away from the conventional
"front-loaded" approach to regulation. It emphasizes the need for
learning and reevaluation. It combines, one might think, precaution with
science.
I have chosen not to use either Lindblom's term or the currently
trendy one because both carry baggage I wish to jettison. Lindblom was
too optimistic about the commitment of managers to learning and their
skills in doing so. He believed he was describing the usual practice when
he wrote that decisionmakers proceed incrementally, on the bases of
knowledge gained from past small steps about the consequences, testing
their predictions as they move on, and remaining always ready to
remedy past failures.6 6 History shows, however, that such learning

64. Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through, " 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79 (1959).
65. J.B. Ruhl, Regulation By Adaptive Management-Is It Possible? 7 MINN. J. L. Sa. & TECH.

21, 28 (2005).
66. See Lindblom, supra note 64, at 86.
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systematically does not occur in natural resource management. Left to
their own devices, decisionmakers tend only to look forward. Writing
about water projects, Jeffrey Jacobs reminds us that
[d]espite the potential benefits of incorporating past results into
future planning and operations, agencies shun historical ex post
reviews for several reasons: public criticism of projects under
construction tends to inhibit project proponents from studying
impacts, administrators tend to avoid exercises that might cast
them in a negative light or be unduly expensive, water project
effects are not always clearly manifest or understood, and the
multidisciplinary knowledge required to comprehensively
evaluate a project or program is rarely found within a single
organization. 67
Similar dynamics impede learning in other natural resource contexts.
In reality, then, Lindblom's "muddling through" tends to reduce to
action without learning.
The term "adaptive management" is also tainted. It has been co-opted
in two distinct ways. On the management side, it has been used to
emphasize the need to act while downplaying the role of learning.
Promises of adaptive management have become excuses to act in the
face of uncertainty, providing empty assurances of environmental
protection without any enforceable requirements for learning or
incorporating new knowledge.6 8
From the scientific side, the term "adaptive management" suffers
from a different problem. Some architects of the adaptive management
movement have so emphasized one particular path to learning, largescale management experiments, that it has become almost a fetish and a
barrier to less ideal but more practical paths. As noted above, even small
management experiments face daunting barriers in many systems.
Experiments are by nature risky and their impacts may be irreversible.
Failure could harm, rather than benefit, protected resources. Managers
may quite reasonably fear that success would go unnoticed but failure
would be severely punished.
Maximizing learning requires sensitivity to such very real barriers.
Rather than reflexively criticizing managers who fail to undertake

67. Jeffrey W. Jacobs, Broadening U.S. Water Resources Project Planning and Evaluation, 42
NAT. RESOURCES J. 21, 22 (2002).
68. See Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, the EndangeredSpecies Act, and the Institutional
Challenges of "New Age " Environmental Protection,41 WASHBURN L.J. 50, 53 (2001).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 82:547, 2007

management experiments, we should ask whether experimentation is
possible and if so whether its benefits justify its costs. I have deliberately
used the term "learning while doing" rather than "learning by doing" to
emphasize that there are many routes to knowledge. Managers should be
encouraged to broadly examine all the possibilities for learning and to be
prepared to exploit those that appear most useful in a particular situation.
Where experiments are scientifically difficult or politically unacceptable,
managers should consider less invasive techniques, including modeling,
laboratory work, extrapolation from other systems, and mining historical
data.
B.

What Does Learning While Doing Require, and How Can We Get
There?

There are any number of reasons why management-relevant learning
does not occur. Some information gaps, I freely concede, are simply too
broad to be bridged on relevant time scales. But in many other situations
we fail to take advantage of available opportunities for learning.
Regulatory and management agencies do not naturally adopt a learning
focus. Barriers include lack of funding, lukewarm support (at best) from
above and below, opposition from political constituencies, and
institutional structures and cultures that do not reinforce or reward
learning. A push toward learning is needed, together with the resources
and culture to support learning. The needed elements are not likely to
come from a single source. Agency leaders, legislatures, and courts can
all contribute.
1.

Agency Discretion and Leadership

Agencies frequently enjoy sufficient discretionary authority to put a
commitment to learning while doing in place.69 I pointed out earlier the
extent to which FIFRA allows a learning-based approach to pesticide
registration. The laws under which public lands and other natural
resources are managed often provide even more discretion. Agencies

69. There are, of course, exceptions. The general requirement that the Army Corps of Engineers
turn non-navigational projects over to non-federal sponsors after construction, for example, imposes
a serious check on the ability of the Corps to engage in structured learning relevant to operation of
those projects. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT FOR WATER RESOURCES
PROJECT PLANNING 44 (2004). In general, however, a great deal of discretionary authority to
promote learning goes unused.
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may even have the ability to advance learning by interpreting the 70laws
they implement as imposing obligations for information production.
At the same time, agencies typically enjoy enough discretion to allow
them to perpetuate ignorance. Unless learning is systematically rewarded
by the legislature or the highest levels of the executive branch-which is
rare--there is little external incentive for agency leaders to buck
tradition. Internal incentives are likely to run the other way. Moving to
an active learning approach requires resources and trained personnel. A
strong learning while doing approach to Bt corn regulation, for example,
would have required that EPA design and oversee experiments testing
the effectiveness of alternative structures for insect refuges in delaying
the evolution of resistance. Experimental design and oversight is an
unfamiliar task for agencies and likely to prove resource-intensive.
Effective leadership can help move agencies toward a greater
commitment to learning. Such a move requires leaders who have both
the motivation to push learning and the personality to carry it off. The
right personality is largely an accident of birth. In order to take
advantage of the discretion that allows agency learning, leaders must be
skilled salespeople able to persuade superiors, subordinates, and funders
of the value of learning. The motivation to push learning is likely to be a
product of training and experience. It can come from a strong
commitment to the agency mission, combined with two other factors: the
firm conviction that achieving the mission requires learning, and the
awareness of the systematic barriers that make learning difficult. That
combination is most likely to be found in someone whose background
combines real-world agency experience with close contact with highquality scientific work, or vice versa. One example is Samuel Luoma,
the first Lead Scientist of the short-lived CalFed Bay-Delta state-federal
cooperative management experiment. Prior to joining CalFed, Luoma
was a career scientist at the United States Geological Survey (USGS).
USGS is not a regulatory agency, but Luoma had also tasted the
challenges of regulatory work through service on scientific advisory
panels to EPA. With the help of generous funding dedicated to science,
Luoma used standing scientific review boards, targeted grant funding

70. Cf Holly Doremus, The Purposes, Effects, and Future of the Endangered Species Act's Best
Available Science Mandate, 34 ENVTL. L. 397, 444 (2004) (arguing that the ESA could be
administratively interpreted in such a way as to provide far stronger incentives for information
production).
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opportunities, and monitoring and performance measures to instill a
culture of scientific learning at CalFed. 7'
2.

Legislaturesand Budgeting

Legislatures can take a variety of steps to encourage learning while
doing. They can, and frequently do, require that agencies act on the basis
of the "best available scientific information., 72 Such mandates serve
both to require that agencies confront the latest scientific findings when
they make decisions and to protect against the paralyzing search for
ever-better scientific support. Legislatures can mandate specific studies
when they recognize key data gaps.73 Like agency leaders, legislatures
can invoke outside expert review or periodic public reporting
requirements as incentives for learning. They can explore a variety of
other mechanisms for rewarding learning and punishing intellectual
complacency.
By far the most important contribution legislatures can make to
learning while doing, however, is to support it through stable and
sufficient funding sources. Without targeted funding for new research, as
well as for interpretation and wide sharing of data, "best available
science" mandates can have the unintended effect of freezing the state of
knowledge. Funding is one of the biggest challenges for management
research programs. Legislatures, which control the purse strings, seem
systematically inclined to target funding toward action to the exclusion
71. See Katherine L. Jacobs et al., Ca/Fed: An Experiment in Science and Decisionmaking,
ENV'T, Jan.-Feb. 2003, at 30. For a general description of the CalFed Science Program as initially
conceived, see CalFed Bay-Delta Program, Programmatic Record of Decision 74-76 (Aug. 28,
2000), available at http://calwater.ca.gov/Archives/GeneralArchive/rod/ROD8-28-00.pdf. An
impressive testament to the Science Program is that it has proven enduring enough to survive the
collapse of the state-federal partnership.
72. Best available science requirements are found in, among others, the Endangered Species Act,
Marine Mammal Protection Act, and the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management
Act. For a partial listing of federal best available science mandates, see Doremus, supra note 70, at
405 n.45 (2004).
73. In 1997, for example, Congress amended the Marine Mammal Protection Act to direct the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to carry out three specific studies-a
review of stress-related research and dolphin necropsy samples; a review of historical data; and an
experimental study of the effects on dolphins of repeated chasing and capturing-before
determining whether to expand the "dolphin-safe" tuna label to cover tuna fishing techniques that
involve encircling but not directly killing dolphins. 16 U.S.C. § 1414a(a)(3) (2006). The Ninth
Circuit recently held that NOAA must conduct the required studies with a sufficient sample size to
support population-level inferences about the impact of encirclement on dolphins. Earth Island Inst.
v. Hogarth, 484 F.3d 1123, 1131 (9th Cir. 2007).
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of learning. Made up as they are of political actors with short time
horizons, legislatures understandably crave immediate results. They tend
to see action, rather than research or monitoring, as the most likely
source of such results. In addition, legislatures may be attuned to the
desires of those who benefit from the status quo-those who may
strongly oppose the devotion of additional resources to discovering
information that increases the likelihood of regulation.
Clearly, there are substantial barriers to funding learning. A few
recent high-profile examples suggest that the politics can be overcome in
the right situation but that it is difficult to maintain funding in the long
run. The original CalFed Record of Decision called for dedicating a
generous proportion of the agency's funding to the science program.
Later, though, those promises did not turn into hard cash. A source of
resources outside the annual appropriations free-for-all is likely to be an
essential element of any successful long-term program of learning. In
some circumstances, part of that money might come from user or
development fees. It seems entirely fair, for example, that the
Metropolitan Water District, which receives one-half of the water
supplied by the California State Water Project, 74 should finance a
substantial share of the studies needed to better understand how
operation of the Project can be consistent with a healthy Delta
ecosystem. In other instances, support might come from federal or state
science funding agencies. Where the United States has been a major
contributor to the development of conditions that make learning
necessary, as is the case with forest fire hazards, it may be fair to spread
the costs of targeted applied science to the taxpaying public at large.
3.

Courts and Incentives for Learning

The courts, too, have a particular role to play in encouraging learning
while doing. Judicial review can help counter the entrenched incentives
agencies have to avoid learning. To get the incentives right, courts must
balance two conflicting urges. On one hand, in order not to impose
paralysis, they should avoid unrealistic expectations about ex ante

74. California Department of Water Resources, Bay-Delta Office, The State Water Project
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Reliability
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2005,
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(Apr.
2006),
available
at
http://baydeltaoffice.water.ca.gov/swpreliability/SWPRel05-final.pdf.
The Metropolitan Water
District "is a consortium of 26 cities and water districts that provides drinking water to nearly 18
million people" in southern California. Metropolitan Water District, About MWD,
http://www.mwdh2o.com/mwdh2o/ pages/about/aboutO I.html.
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synoptic information gathering and digestion. Deference to plausible
agency guesses about how systems work or the impacts of particular
management decisions is warranted early in the iterative decisionmaking
process, before the agency has had substantial opportunities for learning.
On the other hand, it is important that courts not fall into the trap of
blind deference to agency guesses in the face of uncertainty, which can
encourage deliberate strategic ignorance. Courts must push agencies to
seek useful knowledge where it appears practical to do so.
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Ecology Center v. Austin 75 illustrates
the need for and challenges of finding a middle way. The dispute
stemmed from the Forest Service's decision to implement a thinning and
prescribed burning project in old growth stands in Montana's Lolo
National Forest. The issue was whether the project was consistent with
the forest plan's requirement to maintain viable populations of oldgrowth-dependent species. The Forest Service pointed to studies
indicating that treatment was "necessary to correct uncharacteristic
forest development resulting from years of fire suppression., 76 Ecology
Center responded that even if the treatment would bring the forest closer
to its historic structure, it could alter habitat elements essential to oldgrowth species. As the panel majority characterized the evidence, neither
side "offer[ed] proof' 77 that the treatment would help or harm oldgrowth species. The Forest Service had not "directly monitored the
impact of treating old-growth on dependent species," although it did cite
a report noting that two species of woodpecker had been seen foraging in
treated areas. 78 The Forest Service relied chiefly on what it characterized
as a reasonable assumption that old-growth dependent species would not
be harmed based on what was known about the effects of treatment on
forest composition.7 9
The panel majority refused to defer to that assumption. Its rationale
merits an extended quotation:
[T]he Forest Service's conclusion that treating old-growth forest
is beneficial to dependent species is predicated on an unverified
hypothesis. While the Service's predictions may be correct, the
Service has not yet taken the time to test its theory with any on

75. 430 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2005).
76. Id. at 1063.
77. Id.

78. Id.
79. Id.
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the ground analysis, despite the fact that it has already treated
old-growth forest elsewhere and therefore has had the
opportunity to do so... This is not a case in which the Forest
Service is asking for the opportunity to verify its theory of the
benefits of old-growth treatment. Rather, the Service is asking
us to grant it the license to continue treating old-growth forests
while excusing it from ever having to verify that such treatment
is not harmful...
Although the Service concedes that the opinions of wellqualified experts vary with respect to thz appropriateness of
management activities in old-growth areas, it also argues that it
must have the discretion to rely on the reasonable opinions of its
own qualified experts even if, as an original matter, a court
might find contrary views more persuasive. However, this is not
a case in which different experts have studied the effects of
commercial thinning and prescribed burning in old-growth
forests and reached different conclusions. Here, experts have
differing hypotheses regarding the effects that treating oldgrowth has on dependent species, yet the Forest Service
proposes to continue treating old-growth without first taking the
time to observe what those effects actually are. In light of its
responsibilities under [the National Forest Management Act],
this is arbitrary and capricious.80
Judge McKeown dissented, noting that the Forest Service had supported
its hypothesis with direct
observation of the composition and structure
81
produced by treatment.
The situation in Ecology Center is precisely the sort that calls for
learning while doing. The Forest Service contended that not treating the
old-growth stands would leave them at risk of insect infestation, disease,
and high-severity fire, any one of which could destroy their suitability as
habitat for old-growth-dependent species. Yet the treatment proposed
could also harm the same species. It is not obvious which decision, to
treat or not to treat, would be "precautionary." This is a situation in
which Sunstein's paralysis critique has genuine force-if the applicable
forest plan required that the Forest Service not act in a way that would
put old-growth dependent species at risk, the Service might literally be
forbidden either to treat or not to treat old-growth stands. Indeed, Judge

80. Id. at 1064-65 (quotations and citations omitted).
81. Id. at 1076 (McKeown, J., dissenting).
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McKeown contended that the Forest Service could just as easily have
been accused of arbitrary and capricious decisionmaking for not treating
the stands as for treating them.82
But this is also a situation in which science offers an alternative to
paralysis. As the majority noticed, the Forest Service faced the same
decision at a number of other sites. It had already treated some of those
sites by methods similar to those it proposed to use in the challenged
project. The Forest Service apparently had not carefully monitored the
effects of its projects on the species it was supposed to protect. Nor had
it framed any of its treatment projects as tests of its hypothesis about the
impacts of treatment on old-growth species. In the absence of any
explanation for why such studies would be impractical, the panel
majority was right to demand more of the Service.
Reasonable minds can surely disagree, on the facts as described in the
competing opinions, as to whether the Forest Service had shown enough
supporting evidence to justify deference to its hypothesis. Judges
seeking to encourage agency learning without intruding on agency
decisionmaking discretion will inevitably face difficult line-drawing
exercises. But the basic intuition motivating the majority-that the
Service should be required to test its hypotheses if it is practical to do so
and if the substantive correctness of management decisions depends on
their accuracy-is sound.
This intuition might be applicable under a range of statutes and in a
range of circumstances. For now, though, we might consider just one
additional example, the Seventh Circuit's much-criticized decision in
Sierra Club v. Marita.83 In Marita, Sierra Club alleged that the Forest
Service violated the National Forest Management Act and National
Environmental Policy Act by "arbitrarily disregarding certain principles
of conservation biology in developing" land and resource management
plans for two national forests in Wisconsin.84 Essentially, the Forest
Service assumed that greater habitat diversity would mean greater
species diversity,8 5 an assumption that allowed it to conclude that the
management plans were consistent with maintaining viable populations
of vertebrate species, as required by the forest planning regulations then

82. Id. at 1077 (McKeown, J., dissenting).
83. 46 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 1995).
84. Id. at 614.

85. Id. at 617.
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in effect, even though the road building and timber harvest they
contemplated would produce a high level of fragmentation.
Sierra Club argued that the Forest Service should also have been
required to consider concepts from conservation biology and island
biogeography, such as the role of edge effects and small patch size in
limiting diversity. 86 To support that position, Sierra Club offered more
than 100 articles from the scientific literature. Two professional
societies, the American Institute for Biological Sciences and the Society
for Conservation Biology, weighed in as amici on Sierra Club's side.87
The Forest Service responded that conservation biology had "not been
applied to forest management in the Lake States," and argued that while
the theory of island biogeography was "of interest ... there [was] not
sufficient justification at [the] time to make research of the theory a
Forest Service priority."88
The court held that the Forest Service's failure to employ principles
of conservation biology was not arbitrary or capricious. It observed that
"[t]he Service is entitled to use its own methodology, unless it is
irrational. 89 In this case, the court believed the Forest Service's
explanation satisfied that limited standard.
Maritais a difficult case to parse, in part because the opinion wanders
back and forth between disagreements about goals and disagreements
about methods of ensuring that those goals are achieved. Much of the
opinion seems to be motivated by deference to the Forest Service's
understanding of what "diversity" should mean, which differed from
Sierra Club's. Nonetheless, the opinion can be read to endorse deliberate
(and convenient) ignorance on the part of the Forest Service. It allowed
the Forest Service to avoid confronting the implications of island
biogeography for its management plans because that theory
had been developed as a result of research on actual islands or in
the predominantly old-growth forests of the Pacific Northwest
and therefore did not necessarily lend itself to application in the
forests of Wisconsin... [H]owever valid a general theory may
be, it does not translate into a management tool unless one can

86. Id.
87. See Erin Madden, Seeing the Science for the Trees: Employing DaubertStandards to Assess
the Adequacy of National Forest Management Under the National Forest Management Act, 18 J.
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 321, 341 (2003).
88. Marita, 46 F.3d at 618-19 (quoting the Forest Service's briefs).
89. Id. at 621
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apply it to a concrete situation. The Service acknowledged the
developments in conservation biology but did not think that they
had been shown definitively applicable to forests [in the Great
Lakes]. Thus, circumstances did not warrant setting aside a large
portion of these forests to study island biogeography and related
theories at the expense of other forest-plan objectives. 90
The problem with the Seventh Circuit's approach in Marita is that,
unlike the Ninth Circuit's in Ecology Center, it leaves the Forest Service
in complete control of whether its hypotheses about the relationship
between fragmentation and diversity are ever tested. Perhaps the Sierra
Club or a local academic could monitor the impacts on wildlife as the
Forest Service implements its plans for these forests, but without the
opportunity to make a comparison with the large reserves the Forest
Service refused to create, that evidence would never be "definitive." It is
unlikely that plaintiffs could find a sufficiently large area of similar
forest outside the Forest Service's control to independently test their
theories to the Forest Service's satisfaction.
That is not to say, however, that just because there was an opportunity
for learning the court should have required the Forest Service to seize it.
That is too simplistic. Sierra Club demanded that the Forest Service set
aside twenty-five percent of each of two Great Lakes national forests as
large undisturbed reserves. 9' That would obviously have cut back
substantially on the Service's ability to achieve its other goals. Although
Sierra Club argued that such large reserves would better protect
diversity, the opinion does not indicate that Sierra Club submitted
evidence that any species could not be successfully maintained on the
forests without them.
From a precautionary learning perspective, it is not clear that the
Marita decision was wrong. It is clear, however, that it should have been
approached differently, both by Sierra Club and by the court. There
should have been a closer focus on whether the Forest Service would
need to know if Sierra Club was right about the teachings of
conservation biology in order to comply with its mandate, on these
forests and others, to maintain viable wildlife populations (as required
by the forest planning regulations in effect at the time). If, as seems
likely, the effect of fragmentation on viability was an important issue,
the next question should have been whether the competing hypotheses
90. Id. at 622-23.
91. Id. at 618.
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could be tested by methods other than putting a quarter of the forest off
limits to harvest. If so, the court might have said that it would not defer
to the next claim of uncertainty about the impact of island biogeography
(again on these forests or others) unless the Forest Service tried to test its
hypothesis or explained why it could not do so.
CONCLUSION
Dealing with uncertainty is the signature challenge of environmental
and natural resource decisionmaking. Too often, however, uncertainty is
treated as an entirely ex ante problem requiring only that the
decisionmaker choose an appropriate burden of proof to apply to
gatekeeping decisions. Although that aspect of decisionmaking under
uncertainty will always be important, it has been allowed to obscure the
problem of learning, which is at least as important for natural resource
management. Serial, iterative, and similar decisions can be improved
over time by structured learning.
Both the impulse toward caution and healthy respect for the ability of
scientific inquiry to advance knowledge favor learning while doing
when uncertainty is high but inaction is impractical or undesirable.
Acting incrementally with attention to the feasibility and potential value
of learning is the appropriate form of caution in such circumstances.
Learning while doing is an unfamiliar process for resource management
agencies but one with great potential value for achieving conservation
objectives at the lowest practical sociopolitical cost. Notwithstanding the
apparent value of learning while doing, it is not surprising that agencies
have so far resisted that approach. It will take a combination of
leadership, funding, and judicial prodding to make learning the norm
rather than the exception.
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